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PLEADING FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED 

SUICIDE IN THE COURTS 

CHARLES H. BARoN* 
By the time this article is published, the United States Supreme 
Court will likely have rendered its decisions in Vacca v. Quil/1 and 
Washington v. Glucksberg.2 Many predict that those decisions will 
reverse the Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Second 
Circuits and will reinstate the New York and Washington assisted 
suicide statutes which those courts had held unconstitutional under 
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Some observers suggest that such a result will con­
firm the view that the question of whether and how physician-as­
sisted suicide is to be legalized should be left exclusively to state 
legislatures and that courts, in particular, have no proper role to 
play with respect to this issue. This is a mistaken view which rests 
upon a simplistic notion of the roles played by the various branches 
of government in the American law-making process. 
Courts and legislatures each have their strengths and weak­
nesses as law-making bodies. Indeed, the very qualities that consti­
tute their respective strengths often constitute their respective 
weaknesses as well. For example, it is both an advantage and a dis­
advantage of court-made common law that it cannot rely for its va­
lidity upon a vote by the people's elected representatives. Judges 
who make law must, in support of their adopted principles, demon­
strate a better justification than mere majority approval of the out­
come of the case. Moreover, since judge-made law, unlike 
legislation, applies retroactively, the court must convince the reader 
that its rule of law is so reasonable that it can, with justice, be ap­
plied after the fact. 
Another strength and weakness of judge-made law is that it is 
made in the context of individual cases. This restricts the generality 
• Professor of law, Boston College Law School; A.B., University of Penn­
sylvania; LL.B., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania. 
1. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997). 
2. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub 
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997). 
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of the rules that are developed, and requires law-making to await 
the development of cases that force courts to make law as part of 
the dispute resolution process. Case by case law-making also 
means that the judge makes law in a context which forces upon him 
a close acquaintance with the consequences of his action. Whereas 
the legislator is like the B-52 pilot who drops his bombs on the Me­
kong Delta and returns to a meal at his base in Japan, the judge is 
like the dog soldier who must look the enemy in the eye before he 
shoots him. The judge fashions the law in order to do justice in the 
case before him. The common law doctrine which develops out of 
this process attempts to generalize case law principles which lay 
claim to having produced the just result in each case. Conveniently, 
when such principles are later found unjust, they can be distin­
guished or overruled. Certainly many judges, lawyers, and com­
mentators have come to think of the common law development 
process as one in which the "law work[s] itself pure from case to 
case."3 Sometimes, they have had difficulty accepting the incursion 
of seemingly arbitrary legislation into the law-making process. 
Where the legislation has seemed extraordinarily unjust, courts 
have sometimes declared it to be in violation of "fundamental 
law"-even where there were no written constitutions to supply 
such fundamental law. For example, Lord Coke's action in Bon­
ham's Case,4 struck down an act of Parliament on the ground that a 
law "against common right and reason" is void. 
Of course, legislative law-making has its virtues. The legisla­
tor, unlike the judge, need not wait for a dispute to arise before 
making law, and the law that is made can be as general in applica­
tion and as detailed as the law maker wishes it to be. Additionally, 
the legislator need not restrict his decision-making to the available 
evidence which has been produced in a court of law by parties to a 
case. He can hear from any person or group that is interested in the 
outcome of his deliberations, and the law he ultimately produces 
can precisely accommodate whatever compromises have been 
struck between contending interest groups-it need be justified on 
no other basis than the fact that a majority has voted for it. Finally, 
the process of direct election of legislators is intended to provide 
the electorate with an opportunity to be ruled by the laws they re­
ally want rather than the laws that judges have chosen for them. In 
3. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 
HARV. L. REv. 630, 636 (1958). 
4. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUcnON TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 241 (3d ed. 
1990) for a discussion of this case. 
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theory at least, the legislator who does not vote for the laws that the 
voters want will be removed from office at the next election. 
Both courts and legislatures have played important roles in the 
development of contemporary American law regarding the "right 
to die," but many of the most significant first steps were taken by 
the courts. When, in 1975, Joseph Quinlan approached his daugh­
ter Karen's physicians with a request that she be taken off artificial 
life-support so as to allow her to die with dignity, the physicians 
were quite understandably concerned that they might expose them­
selves to criminal prosecution if they acceded to the request. Long­
standing New Jersey statutes regarding both homicide5 and "Aiding 
Suicide"6 seemed potentially applicable to physicians who, by re­
moving a ventilator from a patient, knowingly allowed the patient 
to die-even when that patient was in a persistent vegetative state. 
Mr. Quinlan and Karen's physicians might have approached the 
legislature and asked that these statutes be amended to create ex­
ceptions for cases like Karen Quinlan's. Had they done so, it is 
doubtful that the request would have been granted. New Jersey 
legislators would properly have feared that such amendments 
would have had the potential for legalizing much more than the 
removal of ventilators in cases like Karen Quinlan's. Legislation is 
written in sweepingly general terms and does not arise within the 
limiting context of the facts of a particular dispute. Moreover, New 
Jersey legislators would likely have been wary of the political conse­
quences of voting for legislation that openly legalized certain acts of 
physician homicide and assisted suicide. Unless legislators were 
sure that the measure was popular, and that it did not have numer­
ous opponents among the electorate who would be more willing 
than its proponents to reelect legislators on the basis of where they 
stood on that measure alone, the legislature would probably have 
refused to act. 
Instead of applying to the legislature, Mr. Quinlan applied to 
the New Jersey courts. The courts ultimately granted the relief he 
requested. Despite the fact that the New Jersey Attorney General 
and the Morris County Prosecutor took the position that causing 
the death of Karen Quinlan by removing her from a ventilator 
would be a criminal act of homicide or aiding suicide, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey determined that the act could be performed 
without fear of prosecution. Concluding that Karen Quinlan's 
5. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:113-1, -2, -5 (West 1985) (repealed 1979). 
6. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1985). 
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"right to privacy" under both the New Jersey State Constitution 
and the United States Constitution protected a decision to die with 
dignity rather than be maintained in a persistent vegetative state, 
the court decided that the State's countervailing interest in "the 
preservation and sanctity of human life" did not outweigh Karen's 
right on the facts of her case. "We have no hesitancy in deciding [in 
the instant case]," said the court, "that no external compelling inter­
est of the State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, 
only to vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibil­
ity of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life."7 
Clearly, the court was moved by the plight of Karen Quinlan and. 
her family, and was convinced that the law should permit them the 
relief they requested despite the lack of legislative sanction. The 
court was also moved to act by a desire to assist the medical profes­
sion. "[T]here must be a way," the court said, "to free physicians, 
in the pursuit of their healing vocation, from possible contamina­
tion by self-interest or self-protection concerns which would inhibit 
their independent medical judgments for the well-being of their dy­
ing patients."8 Toward that end, the court laid down a procedure. 
for insulating physicians from liability in cases like. Karen's in the 
future. Where the family, guardian, and physician of a patient in a 
permanent vegetative state agreed that the patient should be taken 
off life support, and a hospital "Ethics Committee" agreed that 
there was no reasonable possibility of the patient returning to a 
cognitive, sapient state, the life support could be withdrawn "with­
out any civil or criminal liability therefor on the part of any partici­
pant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others."9 
In the following year, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu­
setts rendered a decision that built upon the doctrinal base laid in 
Quinlan. In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
SaikewicZ,10 the Supreme Judicial Court granted relief to physicians 
at a state institution for the mentally retarded who sought permis­
sion to withhold from a profoundly retarded cancer patient a course 
of chemotherapy which they believed to be inhumane and pointless. 
Once again the court was moved to take action by the plight of the 
patient in the particular case and that of the medical profession in 
general. The court wanted to protect Mr. Saikewicz from being 
physically forced to endure the painful treatment that he would not 
7. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976). 
8. Id. at 668. 
9. Id. at 672. 
10. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). 
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understand, and which would cause unpleasant and debilitating 
side-effects while offering him only, at best, the chance of a few 
additional months of life. The court also wanted to establish "a 
framework in the law on which the activities of health care person­
nel and other persons can find support."ll Like the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts based 
its decision on the constitutional right to privacy which, according 
to the court, "encompasses the right of a patient to preserve his or 
her right to privacy against unwanted infringements of bodily integ­
rity in appropriate circumstances."12 However, the court then 
made an effort to develop the law of the right to die beyond the 
point to which it had been taken in Quinlan. 
First, the court made an attempt to generalize .the principles 
that it was applying beyond the narrow facts of cases involving pa­
tients in a persistent vegetative state or terminally-ill cancer pa­
tients. It did this by first delineating four State interests which, in 
every instance, were to be weighed against the patient's right to 
privacy in determining whether the patient had a right to die under 
the circumstances of the case.13 These were identified state inter­
ests in a) protecting innocent third parties (such as dependent chil­
dren), b) preventing suicide, c) protecting the ethical integrity of 
the medical profession, and d) preserving human life.14 The last of 
these, the court stated, deserved the greatest consideration.15 But it 
was to be given much reduced weight in any· case, such as the one 
before the court, where the question was not one of saving life but 
merely prolonging it.16 
The interest of the State in prolonging a life, must be reconciled 
with the interest of an individual to reject the traumatic cost of 
that prolongation. There is a substantial distinction in the State's 
insistence that human life be saved where the affliction is cura­
ble, as opposed to the State interest where, as here, the issue is 
not whether but when, for how long, and at what cost to the indi­
vidual that life may be briefly extendedP 
Second, the court developed a significantly different process 
from the one in Quinlan for protecting the rights of incompetent 
11. Id. at 422. 
12. Id. at 424. 
13. See id. at 425-27. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. at 425. 
16. See id. at 425-26. 
17. Id. 
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patients. Rather than merely delegating decision-making power to 
the patient's guardian, family, and physician together with a hospi­
tal ethics committee, the Saikewicz court required that procedures 
be established for determining what the patient would have wanted 
for himself if he had been competent to make the decision. The 
court believed that 
both the guardian ad litem in his recommendation and the judge 
in his decision should have attempted (as they did) to ascertain 
the incompetent person's actual interests and preferences. In 
short, the decision in cases [involving incompetent patients] 
should be that which would be made by the incompetent person, 
if that person were competent, but taking into account the pres­
ent and future incompetency of the individual as one of the fac­
tors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making 
process of the competent person. IS 
The court, realizing that such a test presented special dangers, par­
ticularly in the case of a profoundly retarded patient, hastened to 
add: "[T]he chance of a longer life carries the same weight for 
Saikewicz as for any other person, the value of life under the law 
having no relation to intelligence or social position."19 In order to 
make sure that the test was applied in a non-discriminatory fashion, 
the court determined that it should be administered by a court of 
law.20 The court reasoned that 
such questions of life and death ... require the process of de­
tached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the 
ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created. 
Achieving this ideal is [the court's] responsibility ... , and is not 
to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent the 
"morality and conscience of our society," no matter how highly 
motivated or impressively constituted.21 
Over the next few years, the Massachusetts courts made signifi­
cant additional progress in developing and refining principles of law 
in this area. In 1978, the Massachusetts Appeals Court rendered 
two noteworthy decisions. In Lane v. Candura,22 the court reversed 
a lower court's finding that a seventy-seven year old widow suffer­
ing from gangrene of her right leg and foot was mentally incompe­
18. Id. at 431. 
19. Id. 
20. See id. at 435. 
21. Id. 
22. 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. a. 1978). 
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tent to refuse an amputation that her doctors claimed was necessary 
to keep her alive.23 Since Mrs. Candura, unlike Mr. Saikewicz, was 
not terminally ill, the court had to deal with the issue of whether a 
patient had the right to refuse an amputation that could be classi­
fied as "life-saving" rather than merely "life-prolonging."24 Finding 
the Saikewicz distinction to be unworkable in the case before it, the 
court created new one based upon the "intrusiveness" of the pro­
posed medical intervention:25 
The ... State interests [in] the preservation of life and the protec­
tion of the integrity of the medical profession, call for a balancing 
of those interests against the "strong interest [of the individual] 
in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integ­
rity." The magnitude o/the invasion proposed in this case is deci­
sive in applying the balancing test.26 
In the second 1978 case, In re Dinnerstein,27 the Appeals Court 
directed the lower court to rule that an attending physician could 
lawfully issue a do not resuscitate order for an incompetent patient 
despite the fact that there had been no court determination, as 
seemed to be required by Saikewicz, that the patient would have 
asked for such action to be taken if she had been competent to 
ask.28 Mrs. Dinnerstein suffered from Alzheimer's disease, was to­
tally paralyzed on her left side, and was confined to a hospital bed 
in what the court called "an essentially vegetative state."29 
She [was] fed through a naso-gastric tube, intravenous feeding 
having been abandoned because it came to cause her pain. It is 
probable that she [was] experiencing some discomfort from the 
naso-gastric tube, which [could have] cause[ed] irritation, ulcera­
tion, and infection in her throat and esophageal tract, and which 
[was] removed from time to time, and that procedure itself 
cause[d) discomfort. She [was] catheterized and also, of course, 
require[d] bowel care. Apart from her Alzheimer'S disease and 
paralysis, she suffer[ed] from high blood pressure which [was] 
difficult to control; there [was] risk in lowering it due to a con­
striction in an artery leading to a kidney. She [had] a serious, 
life-threatening coronary artery disease, due to arteriosclerosis. 
23. See id. at 1236. 
24. See id. at 1233. 
25. See id. 
26. Id. at 1233 n.2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
27. 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). 
28. See id. at 137-39. 
29. Id. at 135. 
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Her condition [was] hopeless, but it [was] difficult to predict ex­
actly when she [WOUld] die. Her life expectancy [was] no more 
than a year, but she could go into cardiac or respiratory arrest at 
any time. One of these, or another stroke, [was] most likely to be 
the immediate cause of her death.30 
In light of the utter hopelessness of Mrs. Dinnerstein's condition 
and the highly intrusive nature of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, 
the court concluded that it was unnecessary for a court to deter­
mine what Mrs. Dinnerstein would have wanted for herself,31 be­
cause, according to the court, 
[This] case [did] not ... present, the type of significant treatment 
choice or election which, in light of sound medical advice, [was] 
to be made by the patient, if competent to do so. . . . This case 
[did] not offer a life-saving or life-prolonging treatment alterna­
tive within the meaning of the Saikewicz case. It present[ed] a 
question peculiarly within the competence of the medical profes­
sion of what measures are appropriate to ease the imminent pass­
ing of an irreversibly, terminally ill patient in light of the patient's 
history and condition and the wishes of her family.32 
In 1979, the Supreme Judicial Court had an opportunity to re­
consider the life-prolonging versus life-saving treatment distinction 
it had employed in Saikewicz, and rejected it in favor of the intru­
siveness standard of Candura and Dinnerstein. In Commissioner of 
Correction v. Myers,33 the court held that a prisoner who suffered 
total kidney failure could be compelled to submit to hemodialysis 
despite his protests. The court's decision was justified on the basis 
that the State's interest in preserving prison discipline outweighed 
Mr. Myers' constitutional right to privacy.34 But, in passing, the 
court noted that, had Mr. Myers not been a prisoner, he would have 
had the right to prefer death over continued maintenance on dialy­
sis,35 since 
the State's interest in the preservation of life does not invariably 
control the right to refuse treatment in cases of positive progno­
sis. For example, in Lane v. Candura, the Appeals Court upheld 
the right of a competent adult to refuse a leg amputation that 
would save, not merely prolong, her life. The decisive factor in 
30. Id. 
31. See id. at 139. 
32. Id. 
33. 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979). 
34. See id. at 458. 
35. See id. 
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applying the balancing test in that case was the magnitude of the 
proposed invasion.36 
Regarding the hemodialysis treatment the court concluded: 
Unlike the relatively simple and risk-free treatments of support­
ive oral or intravenous medications, dialysis exacts a significant 
price from Myers in return for saving his life. In spite of the fact 
that dialysis does not require the sacrifice of a limb or entail sub­
stantial pain, it is a relatively complex procedure, which requires 
considerable commitment and endurance from the patient who 
must undergo the treatment three times a week.37 
Although this statement was dictum in Myers, it was turned into a 
holding a year later in In re Spring,38 where the court determined 
that an incompetent patient could be removed from dialysis upon a 
showing that he would have requested removal if he had been 
competent.39 
Thus, by small steps, the courts of Massachusetts were gradu­
ally broadening and refining the rights of patients to control their 
treatment in a medical setting, even when the exercise of that con­
trol would hasten death. In Saikewicz the exercise of that right had 
been restricted to situations where the patient faced imminent 
death, with or without treatment. In Candura, Myers, and Spring, 
it was extended to cases where the patient was not terminally ill, so 
long as the patient was refusing medical treatment which was prop­
erly labeled intrusive. Fmally, in 1986, in Brophy v. New England 
Sinai Hospital,40 the Supreme Judicial Court extended the right to 
include any treatment which the patient deemed intrusive, even if 
others might not see it as objectively intrusive. Mr. Brophy, who 
was in a persistent vegetative state, had clearly expressed on many 
occasions, before he fell ill, that he would rather be dead than main­
tained on artificial life-support of any kind. He had once said to his 
brother: "If I'm ever like that, just shoot me. Pull the plug." In 
order to effectuate these wishes, Mrs. Brophy sought to have Mr. 
Brophy's G-tube removed in order to allow him to die of starvation 
or dehydration. The lower court had found that this was what Mr. 
Brophy would have wanted, but it did not think that his right to 
36. Id. at 456-57 (citations omitted). 
37. Id. at 457. 
38. 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980). 
39. See id. at 119-23. 
40. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). 
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privacy entitled him to starve or dehydrate himself to death. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed on this latter point, and stated that 
Brophy is not terminally ill nor in danger of imminent death from 
any underlying physical illness. . . . While the judge found that 
continued use of the G-tube is not a highly invasive or intrusive 
procedure and may not subject him to pain or suffering, he is left 
helpless and in a condition which Brophy has indicated he would 
consider to be degrading and without human dignity. In making 
this finding, it is clear that the judge failed to consider that 
Brophy's judgment would be that being maintained by use of the 
G-tube is indeed intrusive.41 
A year before the decision in Brophy, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey decided In re Conroy,42 its first "right to die" case since 
Quinlan. Claire Conroy was an incompetent eighty-four year old 
nursing home patient who was dependent upon a nasogastric tube 
for nourishment and hydration.43 "She suffered from arterioscle­
rotic heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes mellitus; her left leg 
was gangrenous ...; she had [bed sores] on her left foot, leg, and 
hip; an eye problem required irrigation; she ... could not control 
her bowels; she could not speak; and her ability to swallow was very 
limited."44 Because of her condition, Ms. Conroy's guardian (who 
was also her nearest relative) applied to the New Jersey courts to 
authorize the removal of her nasogastric tube so that her life would 
not be pointlessly prolonged.45 In an opinion which borrowed 
heavily from the Massachusetts decisions rendered since Quinlan, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that Ms. Conroy, if compe­
tent, had the right to have the tube removed. Finding this right to 
be based in both the common law of informed consent and the con­
stitutional right of privacy, the court weighed it against a list of 
countervailing State interests adopted from Saikewicz and held that 
none of the interests defeated Ms. Conroy's right to choose death, 
despite the fact that she was neither terminally-ill nor in a persistent 
vegetative state. In language which presaged the decision in 
Brophy, the court made clear that Ms.Conroy's right to refuse life­
saving treatment could not be made conditional on other persons' 
views of the appropriateness of her decision. Accordingly, "[h]er 
interest in freedom from nonconsensual invasion of her bodily in­
41. Id. at 635-36. 
42. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
43. See id. at 1217. 
44. Id. 
45. See iLl. at 1218. 
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tegrity would outweigh any state interest in preserving life or in 
safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession."46 Indeed, the 
court stated that, "Ms. Conroy's right to self-determination would 
not be affected by her medical condition or prognosis."47 Beyond 
that, the court stated that "a young, generally healthy person, if 
competent, has the same right to decline life-saving medical treat­
ment as a competent elderly person who is terminally ill."48 
However, Ms. Conroy was not competent, and the court was 
not comfortable with employing for her the proxy decision-making 
procedures it had used for Karen Quinlan. 
The Quinlan decision dealt with a special category of patients: 
those in a chronic, persistent vegetative or comatose state. In a 
footnote, the opinion left open the question whether the princi­
ples it enunciated might be applicable to incompetent patients in 
"other types of terminal medical situations, . . . not necessarily 
involving the hopeless loss of cognitive or sapient life." We now 
are faced with one such situation: that of elderly, formerly com­
petent nursing home residents who, unlike Karen Quinlan, are 
awake and conscious and can interact with their environment to a 
limited extent, but whose mental and physical functioning is se­
verely and permanently impaired and whose life expectancy, 
even with the treatment, is relatively short.49 
For such patients, the court adopted a version of the Massachusetts 
procedure for proxy decision-making. In reaching an acceptable 
decision on behalf of the incompetent patient, the court stated, "the 
goal of decision-making ... should be to determine and effectuate, 
insofar as possible, the decision that the patient would have made if 
competent."50 In attempting to achieve that goal, all sources of evi­
dence of the incompetent's wishes should be consulted. A living 
will or durable power attorney for health care executed by the pa­
tient while competent-although not recognized as binding by New 
Jersey legislation-might be one valuable source. Other evidence 
such as oral statements, reactions that the patient voiced regarding 
medical treatment administered to others, and religious views all 
might bear on the question. "In this respect [the court] believe[d] 
that [it was] in error in Quinlan to disregard evidence of statements 
that Ms. Quinlan made to friends concerning artificial prolongation 
46. Id. at 1226. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1228-29 (citation omitted). 
50. Id. at 1229. 
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of the lives of others who were terminally ill."51 
The court emphasized that the test was to be subjective. "The 
question is not," said the court, "what a reasonable or average per­
son would have chosen to do under the circumstances but what the 
particular patient would have done if able to choose for himself."52 
However, the court realized that in many cases there would not be 
sufficient evidence to make it "clear that the particular patient 
would have refused the treatment under the circumstances in­
volved."53 So as not to "foreclose the possibility of humane actions, 
which may involve termination of life-sustaining treatment, for per­
sons who never clearly expressed their desires about life-sustaining 
treatment,"54 the court decided to offer two alternatives to its pure 
subjective test. Under one, the "limited-objective test," a patient in 
Ms. Conroy's situation could have life-sustaining treatment with­
held or withdrawn where "there is some trustworthy evidence that 
the patient would have refused the treatment, and the decision­
maker is satisfied that it is clear that the burdens of the patient's 
continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life 
for him."55 Under the other, the "pure-objective test," a patient 
could be permitted to die without any showing of what the patient 
would have wanted. However, it would be necessary to prove that 
"the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life 
with the treatment [are] such that the effect of administering life­
sustaining treatment would be inhumane" in addition to showing 
that the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment clearly 
and markedly outweigh any benefits to him.56 Even under the 
pure-objective test, the court made clear that "life-sustaining treat­
ment should not be withdrawn from an incompetent patient who 
had previously expressed a wish to be kept alive in spite of any pain 
that he might experience."57 
At one point in its opinion, the court complained about being 
forced to fashion so much complicated law to fill the vacuum left by 
the legislature's failure to take action regarding the right to die in 
the nine years since Quinlan. 
Perhaps it would be best if the Legislature formulated clear stan­
51. Id. at 1230. 
52. Id. at 1229. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1231. 
55. Id. at 1232. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
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dards for resolving requests to terminate life-sustaining treat­
ment for incompetent patients. As an elected body, the 
Legislature is better able than any other single institution to re­
tlect the social values at stake. In addition, it has the resources 
and ability to synthesize vast quantities of data and opinions from 
a variety of fields and to formulate general guidelines that may 
be applicable to a broad range of situations.58 
However, the court noted "[w]e have had the benefit of some legis­
lation in this state concerning the rights of the institutionalized eld­
erly," including rules "directed to the protection of the civil and 
human rights of the elderly confined to long-term care facilities and 
similar institutions."59 Among these rules was one enacted in 1983 
that charged the state Office of the Ombudsman for the Institution­
alized Elderly with responsibility for protecting institutionalized 
elderly patients from "abuse"-a term which was defined to include 
"wilful deprivation of services which are necessary to maintain a 
person's physical or mental health."60 This new provision, the court 
noted, creates "a vehicle for safeguarding the rights of elderly, insti­
tutionalized, incompetent patients both to receive medical treat­
ment and to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment under certain 
circumstanceS."61 The court availed itself of this vehicle by estab­
lishing a procedure for future cases in which life-sustaining treat­
ment could not be withheld or withdrawn from an elderly, 
institutionalized, incompetent patient unless the Ombudsman had 
first determined that no abuse was taking place. This he was to do 
by investigating the situation and taking evidence from the attend­
ing physician and nurses, from the patient's guardian and family, 
and from two independent physicians appointed for the purpose of 
confirming the patient's medical condition and prognosis. 
At the very end of the Conroy opinion, the court summed up 
its work by saying: 
We have not attempted to set forth guidelines for decision­
making with respect to life-sustaining treatment in a variety of 
other situations that are not currently before us. Innumerable 
variations are possible. However, each case-such as that of the 
severely deformed newborn, of the never-competent adult suffer­
ing from a painful and debilitating illness, and of the mentally 
58. Id. at 1220-21 (footnote omitted). 
59. Id. at 1221 (referring to N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27G-1 to -16 (West 1986 & 
Supp. 1997». 
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:27G-2a (West 1986). 
61. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1239. 
384 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:371 
alert quadriplegic who has given up on life-poses its own unique 
difficulties. We do not deem it advisable to attempt to resolve all 
such human dilemmas in the context of this case. It is preferable, 
in our view, to move slowly and to gain experience in this highly 
sensitive field. As we noted previously, the Legislature is better 
equipped than we to develop and frame a comprehensive plan 
for resolving these problems.62 
By 1987, the New Jersey legislature still had not acted, and the 
New Jersey Supreme Court was confronted with three more right to 
die cases in which it was required to make law. "[T]hese three ap­
peals," said the court, "concern the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from three women suffering from incurable and irrevers­
ible medical conditions. Because of their ages, places of residence, 
and medical conditions, none of their cases falls within the factual 
pattern of either of our seminal decisions, Quinlan or Conroy."63 
The court recognized, as it did in Conroy, "and as have numerous 
other courts, that given the fundamental societal questions that 
must be resolved, the Legislature is the proper branch of govern­
ment to set guidelines in this area."64 
[P]atients and their families and physicians are increasingly being 
faced with these difficult and complex decisions without legisla­
tive guidelines and under the threat of civil and criminal liability. 
Until the Legislature acts, it is to the courts that the public must 
look for the guidelines and procedures under which life-sus­
taining medical treatment may be withdrawn or withheld. Sensi­
tive to the patients' rights to self-determination, but cognizant of 
the vulnerability of the sick, [the courts] strive to protect all of 
the relevant interests.65 
In the first of the three cases, In re Farrell,66 the court estab­
lished principles and procedures for cases where competent patients 
dying at home requested that their deaths be hastened through re­
moval of life-support. Kathleen Farrell was a thirty-four year old 
woman who was dying at home of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. In 
November of 1985, "after an experimental program that her hus­
band characterized as 'their last hope' had failed, Mrs. Farrell told 
him that she wanted to be disconnected from the respirator that 
62. Id. at 1244. 
63. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 406-07 (NJ. 1987) (citations omitted). 
64. Id. at 407 (citations omitted). 
65. Id. at 408. 
66. 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987). 
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sustained her breathing."67 A consulting psychologist met with 
Mrs. Farrell and concluded that "Mrs. Farrell had made an in­
formed, voluntary, and competent decision to remove the respira­
tor."68 Nonetheless, because of doubts as to the legality of 
hastening Mrs. Farrell's death in this fashion, Mr. Farrell applied to 
the New Jersey courts for, among other things, "a declaratory judg­
ment that he and anyone who assisted him in disconnecting her res­
pirator would incur no civil or criminalliability."69 The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey held that the respirator could be removed 
without fear of liability so long as certain procedures were followed. 
First, it must be determined "that the patient is competent and 
properly informed about his or her prognosis, the alternative treat­
ments available, and the risk involved in the withdrawal of the life­
sustaining treatment .. " [Furthermore] the patient [must make] 
his or her choice voluntarily and without coercion."70 Second, "the 
patient's right to choose to disconnect the life-sustaining apparatus 
must be balanced against the four potentially countervailing state 
interests [which we have discussed]. Generally, a competent in­
formed patient's interest in freedom from nonconsensual invasion 
of her bodily integrity would outweigh any state interest."71 Third, 
in order to 
protect the patient who is at home, [the court required] that two 
non-attending physicians examine the patient to confirm that he 
or she is competent and is fully informed about his or her prog­
nosis, the medical alternatives available, the risks involved, and 
the likely outcome if medical treatment is disconnected.72 
In conclusion the court stated: 
Unfortunately fears of civil and criminal liability have often 
forced family members or doctors to seek judicial intervention 
before they help a patient effectuate his or her decision to with­
draw treatment. . .. In light of this, we specifically hold that no 
civil or criminal liability will be incurred by any person who, in 
good faith reliance on the procedures established in this opinion, 
withdraws life-sustaining treatment at the request of an informed 
and competent patient who has undergone the required in­
67. Id. at 408-09. 
68. Id. at 409. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 413 (citation omitted). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 415. 
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dependent medical examination described above.73 
The remaining two cases, In re Peter74 and In re Jobes,75 were 
the first cases involving patients in a persistent vegetative state that 
the court had faced since their 1976 decision in Quinlan. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court saw them, among other things, as an oppor­
tunity to revisit and revise Quinlan in light of the law the court had 
developed in the intervening eleven years. In Jobes, the husband of 
a thirty-one year old PVS patient in a nursing home sought to en­
able the patient to die with dignity by disconnecting her from artifi­
cial nutrition and hydration. At trial, there was conflicting evidence 
as to whether Nancy Jobes was in fact in a persistent vegetative 
state. Two nursing home experts contended that she fell "slightly 
outside of their definition of the persistent vegetative state."76 Af­
ter stating that Conroy had established the principle that "all medi­
cal determinations made in the course of a decision to withhold 
treatment from an incompetent patient [must] be based upon clear 
and convincing medical evidence," the New Jersey Supreme Court 
concluded that the experts for Mr. Jobes had "offered sufficiently 
clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding 
that Mrs. Jobes is in an irreversible vegetative state."77 Thereafter, 
to deal with the question of the appropriateness of removing artifi­
cial nutrition and hydration in the circumstances of the case, the 
court developed a set of principles and procedures which was an 
amalgam of Quinlan and Conroy. Whereas Quinlan had delegated 
the withdrawal of treatment decision to a group of proxy decision­
makers, Conroy had laid down a methodology for attempting to 
determine what decision the patient would have made for himself if 
the patient were competent. Relying upon Conroy, Mr. Jobes had 
introduced considerable evidence that his wife would have wished 
to be taken off life-support. The Supreme Court determined that 
Mr. Jobes had been correct in assuming that Conroy would have 
governed rather than Quinlan if Mr. Jobes had sufficient proof of 
Mrs. Jobes' wishes. However, the court concluded that "although 
there is some 'trustworthy' evidence that Mrs. Jobes, if competent, 
would want the j-tube withdrawn, it is not sufficiently 'clear and 
convincing' to satisfy the subjective test."78 "All of the statements 
73. Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted). 
74. 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987). 
75. 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987). 
76. Id. at 44O-4l. 
77. Id. at 44l. 
78. Id. at 443 (citations omitted). 
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about life-support that were attributed to Mrs. Jobes were remote, 
. general, spontaneous, and made in casual circumstances. "79 The 
court then considered the applicability to Mrs. Jobes' case of Con­
roy's limited-objective and pure-objective tests. The court ruled 
that the tests were not applicable. Essential to the administration 
of those tests was a balancing of the actual burdens and benefits to 
an incompetent patient. But since there was no evidence that per­
sons in a persistent vegetative state could feel either pleasure or 
pain, there were no burdens or benefits to be weighed. As a result, 
the court returned to the proxy decision-making procedure of 
Quinlan. 
Where an irreversibly vegetative patient like Mrs. Jobes has 
not clearly expressed her intentions with respect to medical treat­
ment, the Quinlan "substituted judgment" approach best accom­
plishes the goal of having the patient make her own decision. In 
most cases in which the "substituted judgment" doctrine is ap­
plied, the surrogate decisionmaker will be a family member or 
close friend of the patient. Generally it is the patient's family or 
other loved ones who support and care for the patient and who 
best understand the patient's personal values and beliefs. Hence 
they will be best able to make a substituted medical judgment for 
the patient. 
Ideally, each person should set forth his or her intentions 
with respect to life-supporting treatment. This insures that the 
patient's own resolution of this extraordinarily personal issue will 
be honored. Failure to express one's intentions imposes an awe­
some and painful responsibility on the surrogate decision­
maker.8o 
In light of the fact that the ability to set forth such intentions con­
tinued to be hampered by the legislature's continuing failure to en­
act living will or health care proxy legislation, the court concluded 
by saying: "As we have previously explained, the Legislature is bet­
ter equipped than the judiciary to frame comprehensive guidelines 
and procedures for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Ac­
cordingly, we urge it to pass legislation in this area."81 
In re Peter ,fI2 the third companion case, also dealt with a re­
quest to remove life-support from a patient in a persistent vegeta­
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 451. 
81. Id. at 452. 
82. 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987). 
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tive state. Its facts differed from those of Jobes in that Ms. Peter 
was a sixty-five year old nursing home resident, and she had left 
"clear and convincing evidence" of a desire to be taken off life­
support if she were in a persistent vegetative state.83 Mrs. Jobes 
had been in a nursing home, but she was not elderly. Thus there 
was no need to involve the New Jersey Ombudsman procedure that 
had been laid down in Conroy. Because Ms. Peter was both in a 
nursing home and elderly, the court held that the Ombudsman had 
to be consulted to make sure that no abuse was taking place. The 
court reasoned: 
We recognize that elderly nursing home patients in the persistent 
vegetative state are threatened by the same conditions that put 
patients like Claire Conroy at risk, i.e., an uneven level of care, 
minimal medical supervision, and frequent lack of family sup­
port. Accordingly, the Ombudsman, in consonance with his stat­
utory mandate, must be given the opportunity to investigate and 
prevent any possible mistreatment of elderly nursing home pa­
tients who have been declared to be in a persistent vegetative 
state.84 
With respect to the proof of Ms. Peter's wishes, the lower court had 
been presented with a durable power of attorney signed by Ms. Pe­
ter in which she authorized "Eberhard Johanning to make 'all med­
ical decisions' for her and 'to be given full and complete authority 
to manage and direct her medical care."'85 "Clearly the best evi­
dence [of intent]," said the court, 
is a "living will," a written statement that specifically explains the 
patient's preferences about life-sustaining treatment. Some 
states have statutes that recognize the validity of living wills and 
prescribe procedures for their execution. Unfortunately, the 
New Jersey Legislature has not enacted such a law. "Whether or 
not they are legally binding, however, such advance directives are 
relevant evidence of the patient's intent."86 
Hilda Peter had not left a living will, but she had executed a durable 
power of attorney.87 
New Jersey's Powers of Attorney statute provides that a "princi­
pal may confer authority on an agent that is to be exercisable 
83. See id. at 422. 
84. Id. at 428-29 (citations omitted). 
85. Id. at 426. 
86. Id. (citations omitted). 
87. See id. 
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notwithstanding later disability or incapacity of the principal at 
law or later uncertainty as to whether the principal is dead or 
alive." Although the statute does not specifically authorize con­
veyance of durable authority to make medical decisions, it should 
be interpreted that way. . 
It would have been better if Ms. Peter had specifically pro­
vided in her power of attorney that Mr. Johanning had authority 
to terminate life-sustaining treatment. Nonetheless, that instru­
ment, which she executed shortly before she became incompe­
tent; Mr. Johanning's explanation that Ms. Peter directed him to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment on her behalf in a situation like 
this; and nine reliable hearsay accounts of her disinclination for 
the kind of treatment that Mr. Johanning seeks to discontinue 
establish clearly and convincingly that Hilda Peter WOUld, if com­
petent, choose to withdraw the nasogastric tube that is sustaining 
her.88 
In 1991, the New Jersey State Legislature finally enacted legis­
lation providing for "advance directives for health care."89 But, un­
til that time, the law of the right to die in New Jersey was governed 
entirely by principles and procedures developed by New Jersey 
courts, out of decisions in cases that cried out for recognition of a 
right to die on the facts presented. At each step along the way, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court described itself as being forced to act, at 
least in part, in the face of legislature's failure to do so-going so 
far as to establish, on its own authority, the legality of living wills 
and durable powers of attorney for health care. In Massachusetts, 
the state legislature ultimately passed legislation which authorized 
the execution of formal documents to appoint a health care proxy,90 
but living wills are still given recognition in Massachusetts only 
under the State's right to die case law.91 Even in states where com­
prehensive right to die legislation has been enacted, courts have 
been required to fashion common law as part of the comprehensive 
package of rules governing the right to die. 
California was the first state to pass living will legislation. Its 
Natural Death Act92 was passed in 1976. Nonetheless, in 1983, 
when murder charges were brought against two California physi­
cians who had removed life-support from a patient in a vegetative 
88. Id. at 426-27 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
89. Advance Directives for Health Care, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 
(West 1996). 
90. Health Care Proxies, MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 2010 (1996). 
91. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). 
92. CAL. REALm & SAFETY CoDE § 7185 (West Supp. 1997). 
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state, the California courts were forced to create a new rule of law 
in order to achieve what they believed to be the just result. In Bar­
ber v. Superior Coun,93 the California Court of Appeals dismissed 
the murder charges on the ground that the law had not required the 
physicians to provide artificial life-support to the patient after such 
treatment became "disproportionate in terms of the benefits to be 
gained versus the burdens caused. "94 This principle was not one 
which the court could derive from the state's legislation. The 
State's Uniform Determination of Death Act95 related only to situ­
ations where a patient's "whole brain" was no longer functioning, 
and patients in a persistent vegetative state retained lower brain 
function. The State's Natural Death Act dealt only with situations 
where patients had executed living wills to direct how they were to 
be treated after they lost competence. The patient in Barber had 
executed no living will; but the patient's physicians had determined 
that he had no reasonable chance of returning to a cognitive state. 
Additionally, the patient's relatives had requested in writing that he 
be taken off artificial food and hydration. The court said that 
the only long-term solution to this problem is necessarily legisla­
tive in nature. It is that body which must address the moral, so­
cial, ethical, medical and legal issues raised by cases such as the 
one at bench. Manifestly, this court cannot attempt to rewrite 
the statutory definition of death or set forth guidelines covering 
all possible future cases. Due to legislative inaction in this area, 
however, we are forced to evaluate petitioner's conduct within 
the context of the woefully inadequate framework of the criminal 
law.96 
The court found the starting point for its solution in the com­
mon law of informed consent, which "clearly recognized [a] legal 
right to control one's own medical treatment [that] predated the 
Natural Death Act."97 Citing to, among others, the Massachusetts 
and New Jersey cases dealing with the right to die, the court held 
that the common law right to control one's medical treatment in­
cluded the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment where such 
treatment becomes "disproportionate." "Under this approach, pro­
portionate treatment is that which, in the view of the patient, has at 
least a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, which 
93. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (1983). 
94. Id. at 1019. 
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 7180 (West Supp. 1997). 
96. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1014. 
97. Id. at 1015. 
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benefits outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment."98 But 
what should be done where the patient is no longer competent to 
express his views and has not executed a living will? As to patients 
in a persistent vegetative state, the court developed an approach 
that was an amalgam of the tacks taken in the New Jersey and Mas­
sachusetts cases. Quoting first from Quinlan, the court said: 
"'[T]he focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the 
reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as dis­
tinguished from the forced continuance of that biological vegetative 
existence ...."'99 Then quoting from Dinnerstein, the court said: 
"'Prolongation of life, ... does not mean a mere suspension of the 
act of dying, but contemplates, at the very least, a remission of 
symptoms enabling a return towards a normal, functioning, inte­
grated existence."'l00 Fmally, citing to Saikewicz, the court said: 
"The authorities are in agreement that any surrogate, court ap­
pointed or otherwise, ought to be guided in his or her decisions first 
by his knowledge of the patient's own desires and feelings, to the 
extent that they were expressed before the patient became incom­
petent."101 The court said if that is not possible, 
the surrogate ought to be guided in his decision by the patient's 
best interests. Under this standard, such factors as the relief of 
suffering, the preservation or restoration of functioning and the 
quality as well as extent of life sustained may be considered. Fi­
nally, since most people are concerned about the well-being of 
their loved ones, the surrogate may take into account the impact 
of the decision on those people closest to the patient.102 
The court noted that 
[i]f specific procedural rules are to be adopted in this area in or­
der to protect the public interest, they must necessarily come 
from that body most suited for the collection of data and the 
reaching of a consensus-the Legislature. However, we would 
[have been] derelict in our duties if we [had] not provide[ d) some 
general guidelines for future conduct in the absence of such 
legislation.103 
A Connecticut case, McConnell v . .Beverly Enterprises-Con­
98. Id. at 1019. 
99. Id. (quoting In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (1976». 
100. Id. at 1019-20 (quoting In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1978». 
101. Id. at 1021 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 
370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977». 
102. Id. at 1021. 
103. Id. at 1018. 
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necticut, Inc. ,104 provides an illustration of the role that courts can 
play in developing common law even where State legislatures have 
provided specific procedural and substantive rules for the removal 
of life-support systems. In 1985, the Connecticut State Legislature 
enacted a provision called the Removal of Life Support Systems 
Act.1OS It provided: "Any physician licensed under chapter 370 or 
any licensed medical facility which removes or causes the removal 
of a life support system of an incompetent patient shall not be liable 
for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any 
criminal proceeding for such removal" so long as 1) the patient is 
terminally ill, and 2) the decision is based upon a) "the best medical 
judgment of the attending physician,"106 b) "the informed co~sent 
of the next of kin, if known, or legal guardian,"107 and c) "the pa­
tient's wishes as expressed by the patient directly, through his next 
of kin or legal guardian, or in the form of a document executed in 
accordance with [this act]."108 The term "Life Support System," as 
used in the statute, included "any mechanical or electronic device," 
but excluded "the provision of nutrition and hydration."109 Thus, 
when John McConnell sought to have a gastrostomy tube removed 
from his wife so that she could die with dignity rather than continue 
to live in a persistent vegetative state, the statute seemed to pre­
clude granting him the relief he requested. What he was asking for 
was cessation of the provision of nutrition and hydration. 
Mrs. McConnell was a fifty-seven year old nurse who had 
worked in emergency medicine up until the time of the accident 
which had rendered her comatose. "[B]ecause of her professional 
training and experience," the court found, 
Mrs. McConnell understood the status of patients with traumatic 
brain damage and was fully familiar with all forms of life-sus­
taining equipment, including respirators and gastrostomy tubes. 
She had, in fact, expressly and repeatedly told her family and her 
co-workers that, in the event of her permanent total incapacity, 
she did not want to be kept alive by any artificial means, includ­
ing life-sustaining feeding tubes.110 
Despite the clear language of The Removal of Life Support Sys­
104. 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989). 
105. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -580d (West Supp. 1997). 
106. Id. at § 19a-571(a) (amended 1991). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at § 19a-570 (emphasis added). 
110. McConnell, 553 A.2d at 598-99. 
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tems Act, all of the judges who dealt with the case determined that 
Mrs. McConnell had a right to remove the gastrostomy tube. At 
the trial level, the court justified the result on Mrs. McConnell's 
"common law right to self-determination, supported by a constitu­
tional right to privacy" which coexisted with the statutory provi­
sions "by which the legislature authorized the removal of life 
support systems under statutorily specified circumstances."111 On 
appeal, Associate Justice Healey would have affirmed on this 
ground. "I believe that the statutory scheme did not entirely dis­
place the common law," he said. 
"It is an established rule of statutory construction that statutes 
are not readily interpreted as abrogating common-law rights." It 
is also a rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation 
of the common law are strictly construed. "No statute is to be 
construed as altering the common law farther than its words im­
port. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the 
common law which it does not fairly express." 
The exclusion of "the provision of nutrition and hydration" 
from the definition of "life support system" strongly suggests a 
legislative intent to address only the withdrawal of "any mechani­
cal or electronic device from a terminal patient." The exclusion 
does not suggest an intent to displace the common law right to 
self-determination of one's bodily integrity as it pertains to the 
withdrawal of other medical treatment, including extraordinary 
means of nutrition and hydration.112 
But a majority of the court felt obligated to decide the case by 
applying the statute to the facts of the case. "Many of the cases 
upholding a right of self-determination for terminally-ill individuals 
have urged legislatures to enact guidelines for appropriate private 
decision-making in these heart-rending dilemmas," noted the ma­
jority opinion. "When the legislature has attempted to respond to 
this urgent request for statutory assistance, we have an obligation to 
pursue the applicability of statutory criteria before resorting to an 
exploration of residual common law rights, if any such rights indeed 
remain."113 The court then went on to interpret the statute to per­
mit withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. It held that the 
exclusion of the provision of "nutrition and hydration" from the 
definition of "life support systems" that could be removed from ter­
111. [d. at 599. 
112. [d. at 606-07 (Healey, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
113. [d. at 602 (citations omitted). 
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minally ill patients was meant to apply only to spoon feeding and 
water provided by mouth. The court agreed that it made sense 
to recognize a ... distinction between artificial technology to as­
sist nutrition and hydration, a fortiori included within the defini­
tion of a "life support system," and normal procedures to assist in 
feeding. In other words, the act, read in its entirety and giving 
effect to every section[,] implicitly contemplates the possible re­
moval from a terminally ill patient of artificial technology in the 
form of a device such as a gastrostomy tube, but it does· not, 
under any circumstances, permit the withholding of normal nutri­
tional aids such as a spoon or a straw.114 
"Our construction of the act," said the court, "implements its benef­
icent purpose of providing functional guidelines for the exercise of 
the common law and constitutional rights of self-determination 
that, as we have noted above, have received almost universal recog­
nition."115 It also, as the court pointed out, provided an interpreta­
tion that would save the statute from any constitutional attack. The 
court said that 
[T]he plaintiffs in the case have indeed raised such a constitu­
tional claim. We need not, however, address this claim on its 
merits when we can instead find redress for the plaintiffs by an 
appropriate construction of the applicable statutes. Established 
wisdom counsels us to exercise "self-restraint" so as "to eschew 
unnecessary determinations of constitutional questions." It is, 
nonetheless, relevant to our construction of the statutory exclu­
sion that our interpretation avoids placing the Removal of Life 
Support Systems Act in constitutional jeopardy.116 
Obviously, common law courts have played an enormous role 
in the development of the law of the right to die. But this is not to 
say that State legislatures have not played an important role as well. 
By 1994, forty-seven states had enacted some form of living will 
legislation.117 Like the California Natural Death Act of 1976, they 
provided competent individuals with an opportunity to execute for­
mal advance directives instructing physicians and family as to their 
wishes regarding life-prolonging treatment. Over the years, several 
national organizations have promoted "model" forms of such legis­
114. Id. at 602-03 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
115. Id. at 603. 
116. Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted). 
117. See Introduction to REFuSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION: A STATE BY 
STATE CoMPILATION OF ENACTED AND MODEL STATUTES 1 (1994). 
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lation, and the legislation that has been enacted has tended to be 
based upon a small number of types. But in detail, the legislation 
tends to be very variegated-evidencing the fact that different com­
promises have been worked out in different States over the funda­
mental value issues involved. Additionally, the legislation has 
tended to be amended frequently as new issues have arisen and new 
majorities have formed around them. For example, many of the 
earliest living will statutes authorized decisions only for patients 
who were "terminally ill" (typically defined as someone who had 
only six months to live ).118 By 1994, the vast majority of living will 
statutes no longer contained such restrictions, and many of them 
had been amended to authorize decisions for patients in a perma­
nent vegetative state who might live on for decades. On the other 
hand, some of the early restrictions have persisted. For example, 
living will statutes in thirty-four States explicitly refuse authorizing 
withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment from pregnant patients.119 
A second wave of statutes regulating refusal of life prolonging 
treatment for incompetent patients took a different approach-that 
of allowing the patient to appoint a "health care agent." These stat­
utes empowered the patient to execute a formal document ap­
pointing another person to make a health care decision for him if 
the patient were to become incompetent. Proponents believed this 
to be a much more effective way to assure that physicians would 
respect patient autonomy.120 At a time when the patient could not 
assert his own rights, the physician would not be left with a mere 
piece of paper containing necessarily vague statements about the 
patient's feelings regarding "death with dignity." Instead, the phy­
sician would receive direction from an agent who had been picked 
by the patient because the agent knew the patient well enough to 
assert his rights for him. Such legislation quickly received wide­
spread acceptance. By 1994, all but one state had enacted some 
form of health care agency legislation.121 As with living williegisla­
tion, the basic types of such legislation have been few, but there 
have been differences in detail-some of it reflecting different com­
118. See, e.g., California Natural Death Act, Sec. 1 § 7187 (e)-(f), 1976 Cal. Stat. 
6478,6479 (repealed 1991). 
119. See Pregnancy Restrictions in Living Will Statutes, in RIGHT TO DIE LAW 
DIGEST (comp. June 1997) (statistics compiled and updated periodically by Choice in 
Dying, N.Y., N.Y.). 
120. See Arnold S. ReIman, Michigan's Sensible "Living Will," 300 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1270 (1979). 
121. See State Statutes Governing Living Wills and Appointment of Health Care 
Agents, in RIGHT TO DIE LAW DIGEST, supra note 119. 
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promises reached in different states over fundamental value is­
sues.122 On the other hand, whether simply because the health care 
agency acts have been more recently passed or because of other 
reasons, such acts tend to have fewer "ethical restrictions" associ­
ated with them than do the living will acts. For example, only four­
teen states have pregnancy restrictions in their health care agency 
statutes as opposed to thirty-four which have them in their living 
will statutes.123 
Of course, living will and health care agency statutes regulate 
decision-making for incompetent patients only where the incompe­
tent patient was competent at some point in his life and had the 
foresight to execute the formal documents required for taking ad­
vantage of the laws. Many cases, such as Saikewicz, involve pa­
tients who have never been competent. Moreover, despite great 
efforts to urge citizens to write living wills or appoint health care 
agents, the vast majority of Americans do not do so. The Patient 
Self Determination Act of 1991124-the only piece of legislation 
passed thus far by the U.S. Congress dealing with the right to die­
requires all medical facilities receiving federal funds to inform pa­
tients of living will and health care agency laws in their state, and to 
make available the forms needed for taking advantage of them. 
Unfortunately, these efforts have not made a significant increase in 
the number of patients availing themselves of those options. Since 
polls indicate that the vast majority of persons do wish a "death 
with dignity" for themselves and do not want extraordinary meas­
ures taken to keep them technically "alive,"125 it does not seem that 
they are failing to take advantage of the laws because they are op­
posed to having termination of care decisions made for them. Thus, 
the question remains of what to do with terminally-ill patients who 
become incompetent without having exercised any of these statu­
tory options as well as with those who have always been 
incompetent. 
As of June 1994, twenty-four states had dealt with the first of 
these problems by enacting "surrogate decision-making" statutes 
that appoint a health care agent for a patient if he does not appoint 
122. See Artificial Nutrition and Hydration in Living Will Statutes, in RIGHT TO 
DIE LAW DIGEST, supra note 119. 
123. See Pregnancy Restrictions in Statutes Authorizing Health Care Agents, in 
RIGHT TO DIE LAW DIGEST, supra note 119. 
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West Supp. 1997). 
125. See G. Gallup, Jr. & F. Newport, Mirror of America: Fear of Dying, THE 
GALLUP POLL vol. 55, no. 33 (Jan. 6, 1991). 
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one for himself.126 Again displaying interesting differences in detail 
from state to state, these statutes typically appoint, in order of de­
scending preference, the sorts of family members that the patient 
would be thought most likely to pick for himself. For example, the 
first choice might be one's spouse (unless legally separated from the 
patient), the second choice, one's adult children, the third, one's 
parents, the fourth, one's siblings, etc. These statutes operate much 
the same way as intestacy laws which arrange for the inheritance of 
one's property by statutorily-selected heirs in cases where the de­
ceased has never executed a will. The patient can avoid having the 
choice made for him in this way by appointing a different person 
under the state's health care agency statute. The surrogate deci­
sion-making statutes typically provide the patient with another op­
tion as well-that of refusing to have any surrogate appointed for 
him on the ground that the patient does not want anyone empow­
ered to refuse any medical options that might be available to him. 
Despite all of the statutes that have been passed over the last 
twenty-five years, families of patients, physicians, and ultimately 
the courts, still find themselves confronted with cases in which pro­
cedures for proxy decision-making for incompetents have not been 
spelled out. Most importantly, twenty-six states do not have stat­
utes providing for the appointment of surrogate decision-makers in 
the absence of execution of a living will or formal selection of an 
agent by a patient.127 In addition, there are situations which are 
excluded from coverage by statutes, such as decision-making for 
neonates and other patients who have never been competent. The 
state courts have continued to show a great deal of thought and 
creativity in fashioning procedures for dealing with such situations. 
Moreover, the courts have been busy creatively interpreting and ap­
plying the legislation that has been passed, sometimes providing lib­
eral interpretations to conservative statutes as we saw done in 
McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc. 
As the Supreme Court of the United States recognized in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Public Health,l28 the 
development of the law of the right to die in the United States has 
been managed almost entirely at the state level in a fashion which 
has engaged courts and legislatures in a cooperative enterprise.129 
126. See Introduction to REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 117, 
at 2 (1994). 
127. See id. at 3. 
128. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
129. The Supreme Court reflected that 
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The state supreme courts in particular have taken on the law-mak­
ing challenges offered by the technological developments of late 
twentieth century America. This has been done in a fashion that is 
reminiscent of the work of the state supreme courts of the "Golden 
Age of American Jurisprudence"-the mid-nineteenth century pe­
riod when the state courts were forced to fashion new rules of law 
to deal with the development of the railroads, the telephone, the 
telegraph, the modern mass-production factory, and the corporate 
form of doing business. One reason for the successful operation of 
this cooperative effort between courts and legislatures is that in the 
area of the right to die, unlike that of the right to choose abortion, 
the Supreme Court of the United States has not handed down a 
rigid national constitutional standard which chills experimentation 
in devising differing legal responses to the problem. In Roe v. 
Wade,130 the Supreme Court used the constitutional right to privacy 
to essentially write for all of the fifty states the most liberal abortion 
statute in the Western World. The constitutional doctrine devel­
oped by the United States Supreme Court and the state supreme 
courts in the area of the right to die has left much more latitude for 
experimentation by means of common law and legislation. In 
Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court's one pronouncement on 
the subject thus far, the Court recognized in passing that competent 
patients were possessed of a "constitutionally protected right to re­
fuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition,"131 but it held that the state 
of Missouri could constitutionally burden that right by imposing a 
requirement that the patient's intent to exercise that right must be 
proved by no less than "clear and convincing evidence."132 The var­
ious state supreme courts that have bottomed the right to die on 
various provisions of their state constitutions and the federal consti­
tution have, as we saw, continually urged the state legislatures to 
develop comprehensive rules for dealing with the issues that were 
raised. Indeed, as time has passed, the state supreme courts have 
As these cases demonstrate, the common law doctrine of infonned consent is 
viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse 
medical treatment. Beyond that, these decisions demonstrate both similarity 
and diversity in their approach to decision of what all agree is a perplexing 
question with unusually strong moral and ethical overtones. State courts have 
available to them for decision a number of sources-state constitutions, stat­
utes, and common law-which are not available to us. 
Id. at 277. 
130. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
131. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. 
132. Id. at 280. 
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emphasized the constitutional aspects less and have used state com­
mon law increasingly-in part, presumably, to provide a greater 
scope of experimentation for state legislatures. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court, for example, beginning with Conroy, has relied pri­
marily upon the common law principles of informed consent, and 
only secondarily upon the constitutional right to privacy. "The doc­
trine of informed consent, said the court, "is a primary means de­
veloped in the law to protect [the] personal interest in the integrity 
of one's [own] body."133 The court then added: "The right to make 
certain decisions concerning one's body is also protected by the fed­
eral constitutional right of privacy."l34 1\vo years later, Farrell reaf­
firmed this aspect of Conroy: "[There] we held," said the court, 
"that a patient's right to refuse medical treatment even at the risk 
of personal injury or death is primarily protected by the common 
law, [although] we recognized that it is also protected by the federal 
and state constitutional right of privacy."13S 
The sort of conversation and cooperation between the com­
mon law courts and the state legislatures, that has aided the devel­
opment of the law of right to die thus far, has much to offer to the 
development of right to die law in the future. It is simplistic to 
think that the law of physician-assisted suicide should be developed 
by only one or the other of these law-making institutions. Of 
course, legislative legalization of physician-assisted suicide might 
bring with it many of the virtues which were claimed for legislative 
law-making in general at the beginning of this article. Last year, 
eight co-authors and I proposed A Model State Act to Authorize 
and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide136 for the purpose of expe­
diting the passage of such legislation. Several state legislatures are 
considering versions of the model act. But the fears that have kept 
state legislatures from leading the way in developing the right to die 
law in the past still seem to haunt the corridors of our legislative 
assemblies. Oregon, has thus far been the only state to legalize 
physician-assisted suicide by legislation,137 and that law was enacted 
through a citizen initiative vote-not by the normal legislative pro­
cess. Indeed, now that the Oregon law seems on the threshold of 
133. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985). 
134. Id. 
135. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (NJ. 1987). 
136. See Charles H. Baron et. ai., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv. J. ON LEG. 1 (1996). 
137. See The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.80­
.897 (Supp. 1996). 
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implementation,138 the Oregon legislature may well repeal the initi­
ative measure and send it back to the people for a second vote.139 
In the meantime, state courts have continued to press forward 
in developing right to die law on a case by case basis. On January 1, 
1997, a trial court in Palm Beach Florida rendered its much-antici­
pated decision in McIver v. Krischer.140 The case involved a peti­
tion by a physician, Cecil McIver, and a patient, Charles Hall, who 
requested declaratory and injunctive relief which would protect Dr. 
McIver from prosecution should he choose to assist Mr. Hall in 
committing suicide by means of a lethal prescription of drugs. 
Charles Hall was terminally ill with AIDS, suffered from a long list 
of related illnesses, and "testified that he, at times, [had] sores over 
his entire body, red blotches, sores in and about his mouth, fine 
hairs on his tongue and sides of his mouth, no feeling in his bladder, 
stomach pains, and [was] legally blind."141 He also testified that, 
[c]ontemplating his future suffering, he want[ed] to die at the 
time and place of his choosing by administering a substance 
which would induce immediate loss of consciousness and certain 
death shortly thereafter. Yet, he [was] afraid that any attempt to 
take his own life at that time [would] be unsuccessful, and 
[would] worsen his condition. Therefore, Mr. Hall [had] sought 
consultation with an assistance of a physician to provide him with 
a prescription for a drug that Mr. Hall would self-administer to 
precipitate his instant death when he reache[d] the point where 
he [was] convinced that his only alternative [was] to experience a 
prolonged period of useless suffering.142 
As to Dr. McIver, the court found that 
[He was] willing to exercise his professional skill and judgment to 
consult with Mr. Hall and provide him with the assistance he re­
quest[ed] to induce his death. Dr. McIver [had] examined and 
consulted with Mr. Hall and concluded that he was fully compe­
tent at all relevant times to make the request he [was] making, 
and that his decision [was] not the result of mental illness or un­
due influence by others. 
138. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act was enjoined before going into effect. 
See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994). On Appeal, the injunction was 
removed. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). 
139. See, e.g., Foes of Assisted Suicide Lobby Senators, EUGENE REGISTER­
GUARD, May 28,1997, at 3D. 
140. Case No. CL-96-15-04-AF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1997) (visited Feb. 13, 
1997)<http://www.law.stetson.edulmciver.htm>. 
141. Id. at 3. 
142. Id. at 2-3. 
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Dr. McIver's professional judgment [was] that it would be 
medically appropriate and ethical to provide Mr. Hall with the 
assistance he [had] request [ ed] at some time in the near future. 
However, Dr. McIver testified he [would] not provide Mr. Hall 
with the assistance Mr. Hall request[ed] because of his fear of 
prosecution by the State Attorney for "assisting self-murder."143 
Faced with such compelling facts, the court granted the declar­
atory and injunctive relief which was requested. In doing so, it took 
full advantage of the ability of a court (as compared with a legisla­
ture) to restrict its law-making to the facts of the case before it. 
"Realizing that the matter before the court is one of first impres­
sion and of public interest," the court said, 
it is emphasized that the findings, decision, and direction in this 
cause relate to these parties only-Mr. Hall, an adult, who is 
mentally competent, terminally ill with AIDS, facing a certain 
and agonizing death, and being under no influence, and Dr. Mc­
Iver, who is willing to assist Mr. Hall under the circumstances of 
this case. Although Dr. McIver, under this court's order, has the 
right without fear of prosecution, to assist Mr. Hall, he cannot be 
compelled to do SO.l44 
On the other hand, in reaching its conclusion, the court made im­
portant new law regarding physician-assisted suicide. Florida's Pri­
vacy Amendment,145 which had been added to the State 
Constitution in 1980, was held to extend constitutional protection to 
prescription of lethal dosages of drugs for the purpose of achieving 
physician-assistance in suicide. "Suicide," said the court, 
may be defined as the premature ending of one's life, therefore, 
in the strictest sense, disconnection from life support or withhold­
ing of food and water are all forms of suicide. However, suicide 
by the terminally ill by their refusal of life supporting or sus­
taining treatment is constitutionally protected, while it is argued 
that suicide with the assistance of a physician through the intro­
duction of a death producing agent is not. Physicians are permit­
ted to assist their terminal patients by disconnecting life support 
or by prescribing medication to ease their starvation. Yet, medi­
cation to produce a quick death, free of pain and protracted ag­
ony, are prohibited. This is a difference without a distinction. In 
those cases where a competent, terminal patient chooses to 
hasten his death the State has little interest in preventing this 
143. Id. at 4. 
144. [d. at 11. 

. 145. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23. 
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type of suicide. It is clear that the State has little reason in forc­
ing the prolongation of Mr. Hall's pain and suffering merely be­
cause he takes medication to shorten his death instead of taking 
medication to ease a longer dying period. The State's legitimate 
concern cannot override Mr., Hall's interest in foreshortening his 
existence by mere days.l46 
McIver is presently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, 
and it is possible that the lower court's decision may be reversed. 
However, this will not stop state courts from continuing to grant 
relief to deserving plaintiffs in cases of overwhelming need for the 
provision of physician-assisted suicide. Such cases are, after all, dif­
ferent only in degree from the early cases which have been thought 
of as establishing a right to refuse treatment. Quinlan, for example, 
is not really a right to refuse treatment case. It is a right to be killed 
or be assisted in suicide case. Unlike Jehovah's Witnesses, who re­
ject blood transfusions (despite the fact that they want very much to 
live) because they truly object to the blood transfusion on religious 
grounds, the Quinlans had nothing against the use of ventilators as 
a medical technique. If use of a ventilator had offered a chance of 
restoring Karen to a sapient, cognitive state, the Quinlans would 
ha.ve been glad to accept its use. The problem was that they de­
cided that Karen would be better off dead than continuing to be 
maintained in a vegetative state, and they saw discontinuance of the 
ventilator as an appropriate and acceptable means for managing 
her death. Similarly in Brophy, there was no principled objection 
to artificial nutrition and hydration as such. The decision in that 
case was not that Mr. Brophy would under no circumstances have 
accepted artificial nutrition and hydration, it was that Mr. Brophy 
would have preferred death over continued maintenance in a per­
sistent vegetative state, and removing food and water seemed the 
easy way to achieve that. 
George Annas, who is himself a foe of legalization of physi­
cian-assisted suicide, has, perhaps unbeknownst, provided us with 
one scenario by means of which courts could legalize physician-as­
sisted suicide through further development of common law. In 
1994, Professor Annas suggested that there was no need for legisla­
tion legalizing physician assistance in suicide by lethal prescription 
because, if looked at in the appropriate light, such assistance in sui­
cide is already legal. "Physicians legally can, and as a matter of 
good medical practice should," says Annas, "supply prescriptions 
146. McIver, <http://www.law.stetson.edulmciver.htm>.at 8. 
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for potentially lethal drugs that have a legitimate medical use to 
their terminally ill patients on request, if they believe that having 
these drugs is likely to permit the patient to live better."147 Since 
prescribing a lethal dose of drugs for the patient who wishes to have 
it at the bedside for use at such time that he or she may decide to 
commit suicide makes the patient "feel more secure ... and there­
fore ... able to live better,"l48 the doctor who prescribes such 
drugs commits no crime of aiding suicide. The physician's intent is 
not to help the patient kill him or herself, it is just to make the 
patient live better. 
Annas's line of reasoning is one that I can easily envision being 
adopted into the common law of the right to die by a state court 
confronted by the appropriate compelling case. I also predict that 
such principles, and others like them, will be adopted by our courts 
of common law for the purpose of continuing the process of legaliz­
ing physician-assisted suicide. So long as our state legislatures con­
tinue to ignore the plight of patients who suffer and professionals 
who place themselves needlessly at risk, we will continue to have to 
rely upon our courts of common law to provide the necessary relief. 
147. George J. Annas, Death by Prescription: The Oregon Initiative, 331 N. ENG. 
J. MED. 1240, 1241 (1994). 
148. Id. at 1242. 
